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Abstract We explored a system that constructs environmentcentered frames of reference and coordinates memory for the
azimuth of an object in an enclosed space. For one group, we
provided two environmental cues (doors): one in the front, and
one in the rear. For a second group, we provided two object
cues: a front and a rear cue. For a third group, we provided no
external cues; we assumed that for this group, their reference
frames would be determined by the orthogonal geometry of the
floor-and-wall junction that divides a space in half or into
multiple territories along the horizontal continuum. Using
Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan’s (Psychological Review
98: 352-376, 1991) category-adjustment model (cue-based
fuzzy boundary version) to fit the data, we observed different
reference frames than have been seen in prior studies involving
two-dimensional domains. The geometry of the environment
affected all three conditions and biased the remembered object
locations within a two-category (left vs. right) environmental
frame. The influence of the environmental geometry remained
observable even after the participants’ heading within the
environment changed due to a body rotation, attenuating the
effect of the front but not of the rear cue. The door and object
cues both appeared to define boundaries of spatial categories
when they were used for reorientation. This supports the idea
that both types of cues can assist in environment-centered
memory formation.
Keywords Place memory . Coarse-grain representation .
Environmental geometry . Landmark . Category . Bias
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When people encode where they are placing an object (e.g., a
key), they encode the direction and distance of the object
relative both to themselves (egocentric coding; Wang et al.,
2006; Wang & Spelke, 2000, 2002) and to nearby objects and
other features of the environment (allocentric coding; Gallistel,
1990; O’Keefe & Burgess, 1996). The environmental features
used for allocentric coding can be subcategorized into environmental landmarks and object landmarks. Environmental landmarks include architectural structures such as corners,
doorways, and the boundaries or geometric shape of the environment. Object landmarks refer to salient nontarget objects
(e.g., a color patch, a floor lamp) situated among the environmental landmarks. Environmental landmarks play a role in
constructing environment-centered frames of reference, define
possible paths for navigation, and specify reference directions
that can be used for reorientation (Carr & Watson, 1908). In
addition, environmental landmarks are thought to be more
stable cues than object landmarks (Lew, 2011). Location stability can be conceptualized as being proportional to the geometric salience of a given location or to the inverse variance of
the location representation. Environmental landmarks indicate
the most stable framing locations, whereas the stability of
object landmarks declines as their distance from a stable framing element increases. Evidence from the animal literature has
indicated that environmental and object landmarks have distinct
roles in orientation processes and engage different neural substrates (see Lew, 2011, for a review); in this literature, however,
the stability of the landmark locations is thought to be a more
crucial factor than landmark type for determining which brain
structures are recruited. The striatum has been reported to
support the learning of unstable cue-based localization, whereas
the hippocampus is thought to mediate the learning of stable
cue–environment associations, and thus to mediate place
recognition more generally (e.g., McDonald & White,
1994). The extent to which these types of landmarks might
be processed differently in human visual and memory systems
remains unclear. We investigate this issue in the present article.
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Frames of reference play a crucial role for encoding and
remembering object locations, because the location coordinates must be specified relative to some reference frame.
Importantly, location judgments can become biased relative
to salient reference frame axes. Huttenlocher, Hedges, and
Duncan (1991) introduced a category-adjustment model and
explained localization bias in terms of two levels of spatial
encoding. On the fine-grain level, the target location is
encoded in terms of a coordinate system composed of virtually
continuous dimensions. On the coarse-grain level, the target
location is encoded in terms of a coordinate system composed
of categories that divide the domain of interest into geometrically distinct sectors. In domains in which environmental
geometry is less salient than the distribution of object locations, Huttenlocher et al. predicted different spatial categories
corresponding to distinct clusters of objects. The center of
each category can serve as a prototype, whereas the border of
two neighboring categories can serve as a boundary. The
category-adjustment model predicts inward bias within the
borders of each category: that is, location misestimates away
from the boundary and toward the prototype. Note that in
addition to layout geometry (sectors) and object distributions,
external cues can also be used to define spatial categories (e.g.,
dot cues functioned as prototypes in Fitting, Wedell, & Allen,
2005, 2007). The category-adjustment model, however, only
accounts for prototype-driven categories, and does not account for situations in which cues define spatial categories
as boundaries. In order to predict when cues will function as
boundaries versus prototypes, we further factored in the stability of the cue locations and introduced two categoryassociation assumptions. First, environmental landmarks can
divide geometric categories, and thus serve as boundaries (and
object location estimates will then be biased away from these
boundaries), whereas means of object distributions serve as
prototypes (and thus, location estimates will be biased toward
these means). Second, when object landmarks are visible
close to environmental landmarks (e.g., near the wall of an
enclosed space), these cues are expected to define category
boundaries in association with the geometry of the task space.
Conversely, when object landmarks are visible but displaced
from any environmental landmarks, these cues are more likely
to be associated with objects and to serve as prototypes that
represent the mean locations of that object grouping. These
category-association predictions for environmental versus
object landmarks are supported by the goal-search behavior
of different species that, in orientation processes, treat
object landmarks (e.g., a rectangular array of four columns)
just like environmental landmarks (e.g., the corners of a
rectangular room) only when the geometric stability of the
object cues is assured by proximity to environmental landmarks (i.e., a cylindrical wall; Lew, 2011). Although human
object and place representations are not necessarily constrained
to follow the same pattern that has been observed in other

animals, this framework provides a principled means of
making testable predictions in humans. In the Discussion
section below, we provide detailed structural–functional
couplings for the possible dissociation between the two
types of cue-based place-learning mechanisms.
For cases in which locations can be specified on a single
dimension (e.g., azimuth), Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991)
category-adjustment model captures the weighted relationship
in an object–category association that combines fine-grain and
categorical information:
E ðRÞ ¼ lμ þ ð1 − lÞp;

ð1Þ

where E(R) is the estimate of a target location, μ is the mean of
the unbiased fine-grain representations (i.e., the actual target
location), p is the mean of the unbiased categorical representations (i.e., the actual prototype location), and l is the relative
weight (or reliability) of fine-grain memory. Bias is estimated
by subtracting the actual location from the estimated location,
as follows:
E ðBÞ ¼ E ðRÞ − μ:

ð2Þ

Huttenlocher et al. (1991) tested the category-adjustment
model with a mark-a-dot task. Participants viewed a dot in a
stimulus circle and reproduced the dot in an identical but
empty response circle. With respect to the angular location
of the dot, the model predicted a geometric bias derived
from the four quadrants of the circle. As predicted, the dots
were reproduced more inward in each category. The geometric
categories were bordered at the horizontal and vertical axes of
the circle, and geometric prototypes were observed near the
45° diagonals of the quadrants.
Furthering Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) research on
geometric bias in a circular domain, Fitting et al.
(2005, 2007) examined whether external cues could function as prototypes. As in Huttenlocher et al.’s study,
participants were asked to remember the location of a
dot in a circular domain. In a stationary condition, the
task circle was fixed in one orientation, and in a dynamic
condition, the circle was rotated to different orientations
during the test phase. Different groups saw different
numbers of cues (three, one, or none) around the circular
field. Whereas bias in the stationary condition reflected
geometric prototypes, bias in the dynamic condition
reflected cue-based prototypes.
Fitting et al. (2005, 2007) presented a cue-based fuzzy
boundary (CBFB) function that predicts the effect of
Prototype j (pj) over multiple prototypes (pk) for a given
target (μ), with the probability

Pðp j jmÞ ¼



exp −c μ − p j
∑expð−cjμ − pk jÞ

:

ð3Þ

1134

Boundaries are inferred midway between two neighboring
prototypes such that the prototype effects are equated at the
boundaries. (The lower the value of c, the fuzzier the boundary.)
This function computes a sigmoidal decline of bias near the
boundaries. The CBFB version of the category-adjustment
model is more flexible than the original version, in terms of
the number and locations of prototypes. There is evidence that
when human observers are immersed in a three-dimensional
(3-D) environment and attempt to remember object directions, similar patterns of biases occur; specifically, geometric
prototypes are found near ±45°, relative to straight ahead,
when the possible target locations are restricted to the front
hemispace (Haun, Allen, & Wedell, 2005). However, it is
not yet known whether the two-category bias of the front
hemispace originates from a transient observer-based frame
or is locked to the environment. We addressed this question
in the present study. If the two categories are coordinated by
a system that constructs the environment-centered frame, we
would expect to see the biasing effect of the two categories
even after the observer’s heading within the environment
changed due to a body rotation.
Category bias has also been examined in dynamic 3-D
environments in which participants moved before indicating
the remembered target locations (Fitting, Allen, & Wedell,
2008; Sargent, Dopkins, & Philbeck, 2011). In Sargent et al.
(2011), participants first learned the locations of six targets
while facing 0° (five of the targets were located between −45°
and 90°, and one at −130°). Next, they were asked to rotate
themselves in a swivel chair, while blindfolded, to face certain
remembered target locations (at −45° and 90°) or to return to
the remembered 0° heading. From these test headings, they
then indicated the remembered locations of all of the targets.
Thus, remembered target directions served as orientation cues
for the blindfolded participants. In the analyses of targets
located in the front hemispace, no bias was found when the
data were plotted relative to the training heading; that is, the
blindfolded and rotated participants showed no geometric
bias, or no association between their target memory and the
geometry of the cylindrical arena. When plotted relative to the
test headings, however, the data did show a two-category bias
(−48° and 55° prototypes) and a dynamic boundary centered
on 0° relative to the participant’s heading after the body
rotation. Since the orientation cues and test headings were
both aligned with the dynamic 0° boundary, however, it
was not clear whether the resulting category biases were
caused by the orientation cues or the test headings. In
another study involving a dynamic 3-D environment
(Fitting et al., 2008), participants estimated one object
location from several entrances along the cylindrical wall.
Either two or four picture cues were provided equidistant
from each other on the wall. The cues were named “north”
and “south” in the two-cue condition, and “north,” “south,”
“east,” and “west” in the four-cue condition. The target was
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hidden 47.4° counterclockwise from “north.” Participants
learned the target location by being led to the location,
and subsequently they estimated the remembered target
location by walking in a straight line from the entrance
locations to the estimated location. Consistent with the
CBFB prediction for a 2-D circular field, cues served as
prototypes in the 3-D cylindrical domain. The target between northwest and west was misremembered clockwise
toward the north cue in the two-cue condition, but counterclockwise toward the west cue in the four-cue condition.
The magnitude of this bias increased when the memory
load and delay interval increased. These 3-D bias profiles
have shown that both environmental geometry and external
cues are used to establish frames of reference that can bias
location judgments. However, a few important questions
remain unanswered: Do the initial coarse-grain representations of an environment (e.g., bisection of an environment)
actually form the basis for spatial categories when an
observer is moving in the domain? Can object landmarks
also play a role in establishing the environment-centered
frame and create different spatial categories? We address
these questions in the present article.
We tested for three sources of bias: the geometry of the
environment, object landmarks, and environmental landmarks
(i.e., doors). Each participant was seated in the center of a
cylindrical chamber and tested for short-term memory of
objects presented at 32 azimuths, dispersed symmetrically
along the perimeter of the space (see Fig. 1). The symmetrical
object dispersion was designed to focus on localization bias,
which is maximized with distance from the effective cue and
then declines with further distance as it approaches the neighboring category.
In one condition, the task environment provided no
external cues other than the geometric shape of the domain
(i.e., a cylinder with vertical or horizontal reference axes).

Fig. 1 Experimental setup. The circle represents the floor of the task
cylinder, in which each participant was seated at the center. The 32
target locations are marked with bold dots. The “Cue” labels at 120°
and 330° indicate either two objects, in the object-cue condition, or two
doors, in the door-cue condition
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This situation is analogous to the 2-D circular domain that has
been studied in past work, but never fully implemented in
a 3-D domain (Fitting et al., 2005, 2007; Huttenlocher et
al., 1991). It remains unclear how many distinct categories
are present when targets are evenly distributed around the
periphery of the environment. One possibility, consistent
with what has been observed in a fixed 2-D circle, is that
the enclosing space would be divided into four quadrants
by two orthogonal axes crossing at the center (see Fig. 2a).
Another possibility is that the body’s sagittal axis would be
sufficiently salient and dominant (perhaps because of the pattern of hemispheric specialization in the cortex for processing
contralateral inputs) that the environment would simply be
bisected into two categories based on the observer’s initial
observation point during learning (see Fig. 2b).
The no-cue condition also provided the opportunity to
observe whether the categories would be laid out symmetrically with respect to the front and rear. The front–rear symmetry hypothesis holds that geometric prototypes would arise

Fig. 2 Potential categorical divisions of our 3-D environment. The pairs of
white and gray sectors represent the geometric categories of the fourcategory hypothesis, in Circle A, and the two-category hypothesis, in Circle
B, assuming the front–rear symmetry hypothesis. The bold axes with
direction labels represent geometric boundaries, and the dotted axes represent geometric prototypes. The two bottom panels A and B show the bias
functions predicted in circles A and B, respectively. The difference in bias
size between panels A and B depicts that the use of more prototypes (i.e.,
four as opposed to two) can potentially lead to higher accuracy

1135

at the centers of all categories (45°, 135°, 225°, and 315°
under the four-category hypothesis, and 90° and 270° under
the two-category hypothesis). In each category, subcategories
on the participant’s left and right would be split by the effective prototype. Target locations were predicted to be biased
clockwise in the left subcategories, and counterclockwise in
the right subcategories (i.e., toward the four or two geometric
prototypes). Since the participant’s vision was centered at a
heading of 0°, we also considered the possibility that the front
and rear spaces would be treated differently in the categoryassociation process (Franklin, Henkel, & Zangas, 1995). The
front–rear asymmetry hypothesis holds that the categories
would be asymmetrical between front and rear, and symmetrical between left and right.
Besides the no-cue condition, we also included two cuebased conditions (object and door cues), through which we
sought to examine whether the categorical structure of an
environment (i.e., four quadrants or simple bisection) remains
in memory and organizes place representations even after
observers move, and whether object and environmental landmarks can both create spatial categories when used for
reorientation. First, we were alert to the possibility that location judgments of our cue-based groups would reveal the
influence of the environment-centered reference frame.
Comparing two particular external cues in our design allowed
us to investigate this possibility. Two cues were placed 30°
from the nearest cardinal direction: the 330° cue relative to 0°
(the study heading), and the 120° cue relative to 90° (see
Fig. 1). The front–rear asymmetry hypothesis predicted that
the environment-centered frame would attenuate the effect of
the front cue (330°) more than the effect of the rear cue (120°),
independent of test headings. In this case, we expected to see
the cue effect more clearly around 120° than around 330°.
Second, different groups were provided with either object or
door cues near the cylindrical wall. This allowed us to control
for the stability of the cue locations. If the stability is a major
determinant in shaping reference frames, there should be no
significant difference in bias caused by the object and door
cues. In contrast, if the type of landmarks predetermines their
function, the door cues should produce different spatial
categories in association with the environmental geometry,
whereas object cues should more likely play roles in defining
category prototypes. In addition, Sargent et al.’s (2011) finding of a bias that rotated with different cue–observer alignments led us to examine whether the bias pattern would follow
external cues, test headings, or both when the two factors were
misaligned. Our cue-based groups had two external cues
(i.e., two doors or two objects) and eight test headings at
different directions. If test headings shape localization
frames, the cue effect would be different in the left and
right spaces after a body rotation to the test heading.
The function of dot cues observed in Fitting et al.’s (2005,
2007) dynamic 2-D domain predicted clockwise errors on the
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left side of our object cues and counterclockwise errors on
the right (see Fig. 3). According to the category-association
prediction, these cues indicate cue-based prototypes in association with a cluster of test objects. Cue-based boundaries
were expected to lie midway between the two cues (45° and
225°). That is, the two cue-based categories were predicted
to be identical semicylinders bounded at 45° and 225°, with
prototypes ±75° from the 45° boundary and ±105° from the
225° boundary.
With the door-cue condition, we further asked whether
or not environmental landmarks have a distinct effect on
shaping reference frames. Consistent with the categoryassociation prediction, if the doors are treated as boundaries when spatial categories are generated in association
with the geometry of the environment, errors would be
expected to fall counterclockwise on the left side of the
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door cues and clockwise on the right (see Fig. 3). In
addition, if both types of cues (door and object) function
as boundaries and reflect cue–geometry associations, this
would support the view that not environmental geometry
per se, but geometric stability, determines the shape of the
cue-based reference frame.

Method
Participants
A group of 45 participants, ranging in age from 18 to 22,
were recruited from the Psychology Department’s subject
pool at George Washington University. We excluded the
data for one participant in the no-cue condition who produced outliers (two standard deviations below or above the
mean error at each target location) in more than half the
estimates. The final sample comprised 14 participants in the
no-cue condition, and 15 participants in the object-cue and
door-cue conditions.
Materials

Fig. 3 Different categories defined according to the cue function in our
3-D environment. When the cues function as prototypes, two semicylindrical categories are bordered at the segment that connects angles of 45°
and 225°. When the cues function as boundaries, two categories are
bordered at the dotted lines that connect the angles of 120° and 330°.
The two bottom panels A and B show the bias functions predicted for the
cues acting as prototypes and boundaries, respectively

The cylindrical chamber, 3.75 m in diameter and 2.55 m
in height, was enclosed by a black polyester curtain. For
participants in the no-cue condition, no external cues were
provided in the cylinder. For those in the two cue-based
conditions, external cues were provided during the entire
experiment. The external cues were a coat tree and a lamp
in the object-cue condition, and two doors (curtain gaps)
in the door-cue condition. Upon first entering the chamber, the object-cue group was asked to take the blindfold,
which was hung on the lamp, and put their belongings on
or against the coat tree. The door-cue group was guided
into the cylinder through one of the two gaps in the
curtain. At this point, they were told that the cylinder
had two doors.
Participants were seated in a wooden chair that was affixed
to the top of a rotation platform that added approximately
18 cm to the height of the chair. The extent of rotation, peak
velocity, and acceleration profile of the rotation platform were
controlled by a desktop PC. The four target objects were a
2 × 4 in. board (5 × 10 × 92 cm), a wooden dowel
(approximately 1.5 cm in diameter), a broom and a mop.
They were vertically placed on separate stands, and varied
from 90 to 160 cm in height. Each object was placed
approximately 1.85 m from the participant. Participants
used a pointer to indicate their estimates of the target
directions (see Sargent, Dopkins, Philbeck, & Chichka,
2010, for details of the pointing apparatus). The “front
rod” of the pointer was 18 cm long, and attached to the
top of a bicycle rim, which horizontally enclosed the
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participant at the level of the chair’s armrests. A 9-cm rod
(the “back rod”) was attached and aligned with the front rod,
and indicated a point 180° from the aiming direction. This
pointing apparatus allowed the chair and the pointer to share a
common axis of rotation (the observation axis) that was located
within the participant’s body. In using the pointer, participants
put one hand on the front (aiming) rod and one hand on the
back (guiding) rod, and looked directly back and forth by
turning their head and torso. Thus, we assumed no significant
difference in pointing responses for the front and rear target
locations due to the pointer rotation axis being offset from
the egocentric observation axis (Philbeck, Sargent, Arthur,
& Dopkins, 2008).
Design
The four targets occupied three quadrants in all study
phases, and either three or four quadrants in all test phases,
with one exception of two test quadrants. The four targets
were dispersed to require immersive 3-D representations in
all trials (see Tommasi, Chiandetti, Pecchia, Sovrano, &
Vallortigara, 2012, for further discussion of local and global
representations). In addition, the multiple targets were
expected to increase memory load and the bias effect
(Fitting et al., 2008).
The experiment consisted of nine trials. Each trial was
composed of one study and two test phases. Participants
made seventy-two location judgments in total. In each test
phase, the target objects were tested in random order. Over
the course of the experiment, 28 target locations were
tested twice and four target locations (0°, 90°, 180°, and
270°) were tested four times. The 32 target locations were
symmetrically dispersed in the two semicylinders split by
the 0° and 180° geometric boundaries, and the two
semicylinders split by the midpoints (45° and 225°) of
the external cues (see Fig. 4). Specifically, each cue-based
subcategory contained target locations at five angles of
7.5°, 15°, 30°, 45°, and 60° from the nearest cue, and at

Fig. 4 Symmetry of the target
locations in our 3-D environment.
Each subcategory contains five
distances of 7.5°, 15°, 30°,
45°, and 60° from an abutting
cue (the labels “1” to “5” in Circle
A), and six distances of 15°,
22.5°, 30°, 45°, 60°, and 67.5°
from an abutting midpoint
between the cues (labels “1” to
“6” in Circle B). This symmetry
generates four common distances
(15°, 30°, 45°, and 60°) from the
abutting cue and the abutting
midpoint
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six angles of 15°, 22.5°, 30°, 45°, 60°, and 67.5° from the
nearest midpoint.
Participants faced 0° during the study phases and were
rotated for each test phase. For the cue-based groups, the test
heading was randomly sampled from the set of eight headings (40°, 50°, 100°, 140°, 220°, 260°, 280°, and 350°). This
was to see the effect of the external cues as prior 2-D studies
have observed cue-based bias on a dynamic task circle but
geometric bias on a stationary task circle when external cues
were equally present (Fitting et al., 2005, 2007). In addition,
the misalignment of the test headings and the cue locations
allowed us to test if there is a bias that rotates with the
observer. In the no-cue condition, however, participants were
rotated to one of the above headings and back to 0°.
The constant heading before and after rotations made
the geometric cues available for both the study and test
phases. In addition, the passive rotations away from and
toward 0° were intended to activate the geometric cues
more strongly for reorientation.
Note that in our methodology, the test headings were
not equivalent between the no-cue and cue-based conditions. Accordingly, we considered two alternative no-cue
conditions that matched the rotation procedure used in the
object-cue and door-cue conditions (that is, participants
were not rotated back to 0° before responding). In the
alternative conditions, observers were rotated to the test
headings used in the cue-based conditions and made
location judgments while updating rotations (Case 1) or
ignoring rotations (Case 2). Case 1 was not equivalent to
our cue-based conditions, in that the cues (geometry)
were unavailable during the test phases. In Case 2 these
cues were available, but conflict was introduced between
the real and imagined headings. Prior studies have shown
that location judgments are better (in terms of both accuracy and response time) at real viewpoints than at imagined viewpoints (Farrell & Thomson, 1998; May, 2004;
Waller, Montello, Richardson, & Hegarty, 2002). Thus, we
rotated the no-cue group once more back to 0° to remove the
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conflict. In sum, the different rotation procedures were
expected to make the cue-based and no-cue conditions more
equivalent, in that the primary cues of interest—external cues
in the cue-based conditions and environmental geometry in
the no-cue condition—remained at fixed locations during both
the study and test phases.
Experimental procedure
Participants were tested one at a time. Participants were
blindfolded after they sat at the chair on the rotation
platform while the experimenter placed the target objects
in the chamber. During the study phase, participants removed the blindfold and studied the target locations for
8 s. Participants were blindfolded while the experimenter
rotated them to a given test heading and removed the
target objects from the chamber. The retention interval
between the study phase and the first test phase was less
than 2 min.
Participants in the two cue-based conditions were rotated
to the same test headings. In the first rotation (Rotation 1),
blindfolded participants were rotated clockwise from 0° to
Test Heading 1. They removed the blindfold and pointed to
the estimated target locations. In the second rotation
(Rotation 2), blindfolded participants were rotated counterclockwise from Test Heading 1 to Test Heading 2. They
removed the blindfold and estimated the target locations
once more. For the next trial, participants blindfolded themselves and experienced Rotation 3 back to 0° by the shortest
path.
In the no-cue condition, blindfolded participants experienced Rotation 1A clockwise to Test Heading 1, determined
in the same way as for the cue-based groups, and Rotation 1B
back to 0°. Participants were informed that they had been
reoriented to face the study heading. Participants removed
the blindfold and estimated the target locations. They again
experienced Rotation 2A counterclockwise to Test Heading 2,
as in the cue-based groups, and Rotation 2B back to 0°. They
were again informed of their reorientation to 0°. Participants
removed the blindfold and estimated the target locations
once more. For the next trial, blindfolded participants
experienced Rotations 3A and 3B back to 0°. Rotation
3A corresponded to the cue-based Rotation 3 in terms of
both direction and distance.

Results
For the pointing response to a given target location, the
angular estimate was the angular distance clockwise from
the study heading (0°) to the pointing direction. The angular
error was the difference between the angular estimate and
the actual direction. Positive angular error reflected clockwise
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error. Several participants did not complete the last trials of the
experiment. The data were 82.84 % complete in the no-cue
condition, 86.57 % complete in the object-cue condition, and
80.28 % complete in the door-cue condition. We did not
replace the missing data. Outlying data points were omitted
if they were two standard deviations below or above the mean
angular error at each target location within each condition.
This protocol omitted 6.47 % of the no-cue data, 7.49 % of the
object-cue data, and 7.04 % of the door-cue data.
We conducted repeated measures analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) on the entire data set of all three conditions
involving participants’ multiple estimates at each of the 32
target locations. As is shown in Table 1, this analysis showed
no interaction between cue condition and test heading, but
there was a significant interaction of cue condition and target
location. Similarly, separate repeated measures ANOVAs on
the entire data set of each condition showed no effect of test
heading in the no-cue and door-cue conditions; no interaction
between test heading and target location emerged in any of the
three conditions, but we did find significant main effects of
target location in all three conditions. In order to test whether
location judgment errors differed across the 32 target locations,
we used different data sets that comprised the 32 mean estimates of each participant for the 32 target locations (collapsing
over test headings). Repeated measures ANOVAs on this data
set showed a significant main effect of target location and a
significant interaction of cue condition and target location. Posthoc analyses showed that the target location effects differed
significantly between the no-cue and door-cue conditions
[F(31, 668) = 2.41, p < .001]. The effect of target location in
the object-cue condition did not differ significantly from either
the no-cue condition or the door-cue condition. To look at the
within-subjects effect of the target location without considering
the between-subjects effect of the cue, repeated measures
ANOVAs were conducted separately for each condition. The
effect of the target location was significant for the no-cue
condition and the door-cue condition, and was marginally
significant for the object-cue condition. On the assumption that
shifts in bias directions are informative about the underlying
frames of reference (e.g., the locations of prototypes and boundaries), the mean error at each target location was tested for
significance. We found significant mean differences for 14 of
the 32 target locations in the no-cue condition, for two target
locations in the object-cue condition, and for one target location
in the door-cue condition. Figure 5 shows the significant and
borderline significant mean differences in the three conditions
(filled dots). The no-cue data revealed a larger number of
significant and borderline differences (16 target locations) than
did the object-cue data (two target locations, z = 3.89, p = .0001)
and the door-cue data (four target locations, z = 3.24, p < .001).
The CBFB version of the category-adjustment model was
adopted to fit the 32 angular errors averaged at each target
location. We used a simplex method to minimize the squared
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Table 1 Results of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on pointing errors
Bias Source

No-Cue Data
(dfs) F value

Test Heading (H)
Target Location (L)
Cue Condition (C) × H
C×L

(7, 2200) 1.73
(31, 2202) 5.22***
(14, 2200) 1.66
(62, 2202) 1.86***

H×L
C×H×L
H
L
H×L

(31, 2199) 0.62
(62, 2199) 0.55
(7, 698) 1.42
(31, 699) 6.49***
(31, 698) 0.7

Object Data
(dfs) F value

Door Data
(dfs) F value

(7, 781) 2.02*
(31, 783) 2.22***
(31, 781) 0.52

(7, 722) 1.5
(31, 722) 2.34***
(31, 722) 0.6

ANOVAs on the data set that contains all three conditions are indicated across three cue columns. ANOVAs on separate data sets for each
condition are indicated under each cue-data column. * p < .05. *** p < .001

difference between the predicted and observed values.
Parameters consisted of l, c, and the values of the prototypes.
In addition, two virtual prototypes were assumed, following

Fitting et al. (2005, 2007), in response to the cyclic character of
the data (e.g., 0° and 360° index the same angular direction).
The two virtual prototypes were placed 360° above the lowest

Fig. 5 Two-, five-, and six-category fits of the category-adjustment model
(bold function lines) to the no-cue data (a), the object-cue data (b), and the
door-cue data (c), respectively. Two cues in Conditions B and C are
indicated at 120° and 330° (vertical guidelines). The model-inferred prototypes are indicated at 68° and 282° (vertical dotted lines) in Condition A

and are marked at various places on the horizontal axis in Conditions B
and C. The 32 filled and open circles on the dotted lines indicate the mean
angular errors at each target location. The filled circles represent those
errors that differed from zero significantly or with borderline significance,
and the error bars are the standard errors of the means
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prototype and 360° below the highest prototype. They were
treated as fixed variables and were not included in the
parameter set. In order to make sure that the solutions
we found were the best solutions possible—that the minima
that we found with our optimization analyses were as close as
possible to global minima—we tried a range of starting values
for parameters.
For the no-cue group, the model fit supports the twocategory hypothesis (see Fig. 5), as the proportion of variance
accounted for was not significantly increased when four as
opposed to two categories were included in the model
[F(2, 25) = 3.13, p > .05] (see Table 2). Second, the
model fit supports the front–rear asymmetry hypothesis.
The model-inferred prototypes at 68° and 282° were
pulled toward the study heading (0°). The boundaries were
inferred as being at 175° and 355°, midway between the
two model-inferred prototypes. Notice the proximity of
355° and 175° to the angles of 0° and 180°, which divide
the observer’s left and right spaces. Thus, we took the
salient angles of 0° and 180° to function essentially as
geometric boundaries.
The mean errors were consistent with the model interpretation in all subcategories (see Fig. 6). The mean errors were
significantly positive in the right–front [t(13) = 2.98, p = .01]
and in the left–rear [t(13) = 4.03, p = .001] subcategories,
and significantly negative in the right–rear subcategory
[t(13) = –3.17, p < .01]. The mean error was not significant in the left–front subcategory. The absolute mean
error was significantly greater in the rear than in the front
[F(1, 54) = 4.13, p = .05]. We suggest two possible

explanations for the greater bias in the rear. First, rear targets
were on average farther from an effective cue because
the geometric prototypes were asymmetrically situated
within the categories, and second, fine-grain memory
was poorer in the rear because the rear was more distant
from the center of vision and behavior. This account
also explains the greater bias around 180° than around
0°. Likewise, correct estimates (zero error) were much
more frequent at 0° than at 180°.
In the object-cue condition, the six-category version of the
model accounted for more variance than did the two-category
version [F(4, 23) = 2.91, p < .05] or the four-category version
[F(2, 23) = 3.1, p = .06], suggesting the utilization of both
geometric and cue-based frameworks (see Table 2). We also
tested for the five-category version, and found no significant
increase in the proportions of variance explained by six as
opposed to five categories [F(1, 23) = 4.28, p > .1]. We were
alert to the possibility that as the number of parameters
increases, significant model fits could be obtained by
chance (i.e., by fitting noise). In the interpretation of our
cue function, however, we used the six-category version,
which was theoretically motivated to explain both geometric
and cue-based frames of reference.
Inconsistent with the cue function in a 2-D domain, one
of the cues appeared to function as a boundary. In the rear
part of the cylinder, the model inferred a boundary near the
lamp cue at 120°. A significant mean error was made in a
predicted direction at 105° (M = –15.38, SD = 26.8, p = .04),
supporting the boundary effect of the 120° cue (see Fig. 5).
In the front part of the cylinder, the 330° cue was a similar

Table 2 Parameter values and fit indices for the CBFB version of the category-adjustment model
Model/ Condition

Two-Category
No cue
Object cue
Door cue
Four-Category
No cue
Object cue
Door cue
Five-Category
Object cue
Door cue
Six-Category
Object cue
Door cue

R2

Parameter
l

c

p1

p2

.8
.91
.47

.07
.06
.07

67.56
59.44
165.98

282.06
309.6
315.02

.69
.81
.7

.09
.08
.12

58.37
3.15
124.53

92.02
98.53
195.85

249.84
266.5
293.09

302.12
346.46
347.8

.7
.62

.22
.13

92.45
0

129.2
116.23

215.21
196.7

276.98
293.91

330.05
338.25

.49
.27

.16
.15

26.37
16.27

89.4
99.48

134.92
159.08

220.91
207.31

279.29
287.45

p3

p4

p5

p6

.54
.17
.12
.63
.3
.22
.43
.26
344.14
340.27

.45
.44

The bold type indicates the best-fitting version for each condition. l, weight of fine-grain memory; c, sensitivity parameter; p1–p6, prototypes; R2 ,
proportion of variance explained.
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Mean Error in Each Subcategory (no-cue)
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Right-Front

Right-Rear

Left-Rear

idea that the study heading (0°) structured the geometric
frame and affected memory of moving participants in
both object- and door-cue conditions.
The door-cue data also implied the participants’ utilization
of the geometric frame. In contrast to the case with the objectcue data, however, the model-inferred boundary at 183° was
not accompanied by a significant mean error. The modelinferred prototype at 99° was accompanied by a significant
error at 67.5° (M = 39.2, SD = 52.08, p = .01).

Left-Front

Fig. 6 Histogram showing the mean error in each subcategory of the
no-cue condition. The error bars are the standard errors of the means.
Left–right and front–rear were differentiated according to the boundaries
and prototypes, respectively, given by the model. The absolute mean
errors were 5.6 in the front and 11.69 in the rear

distance from the model-inferred boundary at 312° and the
model-inferred prototype at 344°. Mean errors were not
significant near the 330° cue, and were relatively small
between the 330° cue and the study heading (0°).
The object-cue data implied that participants relied on the
geometric frame in addition to the cue-based frame. The
model-inferred boundary at 178° was accompanied by a significant mean error at 210° (M = 20.4, SD = 25.94, p < .01).
The model-inferred prototype at 89° was accompanied by a
significant error at 105° (M = –15.38, SD = 26.8, p = .04).
These results support the view that the geometric frame
established during the study phase played a role in the
object-cue condition.
Finally, in the door-cue condition, the six-category version of the model explained significantly more variance than
did the two-category version [F(4, 23) = 3.26, p < .05], the
four-category version [F(2, 23) = 4.47, p < .05], and the
five-category version [F(1, 23) = 4.28, p = .01], again
suggesting the utilization of both geometric and cue-based
frameworks (see Table 2). Consistent with the categoryassociation prediction that architectural structures such as
doors would construct different categories within the geocentric frame, in the rear part of the cylinder, a boundary
was inferred near the 120° cue. The mean error showed a
positive trend at 135° (M = 32.53, SD = 62.33, p = .06) and a
negative trend at 105° (M = –23.23, SD = 41.26, p = .06),
supporting the boundary effect of the 120° cue (see Fig. 5).
At the nearest target locations of 112.5° and 127.5°, the
mean error was smaller, but showed an inconsistent trend.
In the front part of the cylinder, the 330° cue was a similar
distance from the model-inferred boundary at 340° and
the model-inferred prototype at 314°. The means of the
nearby target locations were not significantly different.
The results for the door-cue condition were consistent
with the results for the object-cue condition in that the
function of the 330° cue was unclear whereas the 120°
cue appeared to act as a boundary. This supports the

Discussion
In this study, we asked whether the categorical structure of
place representations constitutes an environmental frame that
can be used by moving observers, and whether environmental
and object landmarks can both play a role in forming spatial
categories. Our findings suggest that the biasing effects of
environmental geometry and external cues differ between
2-D and 3-D domains.
In our no-cue condition, the geometric categories were
bipartite; in prior 2-D studies, the geometric categories had
been quadripartite. This difference suggests that the four
cardinal directions have equivalent valences on the 2-D
surface, and not in the 3-D space. In addition, the two
geometric prototypes were pulled forward in the left and
right categories. This differed from the 2-D case, in which
geometric prototypes have typically been observed near the
center of each quadrant (Fitting et al., 2005, 2007;
Huttenlocher et al., 1991). The unequal valences in our
immersive situation show the pivotal roles of vision and
self-motion information in integrating perceptual cues (in this
case, environmental geometry) into the environment-centered
localization system.
Our findings constitute an advance over the results of
Haun et al. (2005). First, Haun et al. looked at the front
hemispace only; accordingly, they could not address the
question of two versus four geometric categories. In contrast, we looked at the full cylinder, and found that the 3-D
geometric frame was more consistent with two categories.
Second, we could answer the front–rear asymmetry question. Geometric prototypes were located near categorical
centers (near –46° and 33°) in Haun et al.’s hemispace, but
off categorical centers (near –78° and 68°) in our immersive
situation. Third, we observed the bisecting framework in all
three conditions, even when participants rotated before
responding. This suggests that two-category representations
of an environment form a fundamental framework that
supports place representations.
One concern in our methodology is that the cue manipulation was confounded to some degree with body rotation, in
that the participants’ viewpoint was constant in the no-cue
condition, but rotated during judgments in the two cue-based
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conditions. This potentially complicates the interpretation of
the biases that we observed. Importantly, however, our results
showed that the body rotation in our cue-based conditions
(i.e., test heading) had no role in generating the reference
categories. The cue-based biases were independent from the
test headings. Another potential concern is that category information (e.g., via the door or object cues) could have been
directly accessed from the environment during test phases,
rather than being stored in memory. Although this was indeed
a possibility, the blindfolded body rotations in the door- and
object-cue conditions required our participants to remember
the cue configuration and its relation to the environment for
successful reorientation. In addition, remembered cue–object
pairing was required in order for the cues to support location
judgments of the removed objects. If participants could not
store any direct or indirect connection between the cue and
the object during study phases, the category information,
though perceptually available, could not be used to localize
the removed objects. Thus, we contend that the most
important aspects of the category associations were indeed
stored in memory.
Interestingly, in the object-cue condition, the rear cue
appeared to function as a boundary. This was inconsistent
with the cue function in a 2-D domain (Fitting et al., 2005,
2007). The category-association assumptions that we introduced to explain unstable and stable external cues provide a
prediction for the differing functions of the cues. In the 2-D
case, the entire domain (both cues and target) was simultaneously visible, but the geometric frame was undefined after
the task circle was rotated. Thus, the dot cues could be
associated with the object distribution only, and so functioned as prototypes. In the 3-D case, however, the two
object cues were stably positioned near the wall, and
thus could be associated with the environmental geometry in the process of reorientation. In addition, geometric bias did not operate in the dynamic 2-D domain,
but did operate in our 3-D domain. In our 3-D task, the cue
effect, which was clear at 120° but less obvious at 330° (–30°),
suggests that the environmental geometry was mapped into
the environment-centered system and attenuated the cuebased bias to a greater degree in the front than in the rear,
independent of the participants’ test headings.
In demonstrating that an external cue functioned as a
boundary in an immersive 3-D domain, our results differ
from those that Fitting et al. (2008) observed in a 3-D
domain (in which their cues functioned as prototypes). In
Fitting et al. (2008), the whole domain (both cues and target)
was viewed from perspectives outside the configuration.
Accordingly, the cue–object association was more efficient
than the cue–geometry association. In our experimental
setup, however, the viewer was inside the configuration.
Thus, the cue–geometry association was required for
reorientation after each rotation to different test headings.

Mem Cogn (2013) 41:1132–1143

The cue–geometry association also provides an explanation for the results of Hutcheson and Wedell (2012), in
which distal cues served as boundaries in a virtual
environment (VE). One target and two external cues
(north and south or east and west) were studied in a
map on a computer screen. The external cues functioned
as boundaries when tested in the VE, but as prototypes
when tested on the map. Hutcheson and Wedell suggested
that observers are flexible and influenced by the retrieval
context in using category information. In addition, the
category-association prediction explains that, whereas the
cue–geometry association was developed while observers
were navigating and reorienting in VE, the cue–object association blocked the cue–geometry association during the map
retrievals when observers did not need to process an enclosing
environment.
Finally, in our door-cue condition, the door at 120°
showed a clear tendency to function as a boundary.
The boundary function of both the object and door cues
supports Lew’s (2011) expectation that stable object
landmarks can structure frames of reference similarly
to the way that environmental landmarks do. This was
probably part of the category-association tendency,
where cues are conjoined into the environment-centered
framework when used for reorientation. The amount of
bias around the 120° cue was significantly greater in the
door than in the object condition. This suggests that the
cue–geometry association is stronger for environmental
than for object landmarks when both types of landmarks
have equivalent stability.
In sum, all three conditions suggest that the initial coarsegrain representations of environmental geometry coordinate
and bias remembered object locations when observers construct place representations that extend beyond the field of
view. The two-category frame supports rapid processing of
an immersive environment, and thus likely serves as a
fundamental construct of the environment-centered system
during navigating and learning an environment. Henke
(2010) suggested that the hippocampus accomplishes place
representation automatically, even within a single trial. Our
behavioral data of coarse-grain place representations are
consistent with the idea that the two-category frame constitutes a default organizational tendency used by the hippocampal system during place learning and recognition. In this
view, cue–object associations may engage both a rapid,
hippocampally mediated system (in this case, accomplishing
episodic cue–object binding in a single trial), and a slower
learning system mediated by the basal ganglia and the cerebellum (in this case, gradually establishing habits or procedural memories). In our study, both door and object cues
showed the cue–geometry association, suggesting that
both types of cues can create different categories in the
environment-centered frame.

Mem Cogn (2013) 41:1132–1143
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.

References
Carr, H., & Watson, J. B. (1908). Orientation of the white rat.
Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 18, 27–
44.
Farrell, M. J., & Thomson, J. A. (1998). Autonomic spatial updating
during locomotion without vision. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 51A, 637–654.
Fitting, S., Allen, G. L., & Wedell, D. H. (2008). Remembering places in
space: A human analog study of the Morris water maze. In T.
Barkowsky, M. Knauff, G. Ligozat, & D. R. Montello (Eds.),
Spatial cognition V (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp, Vol.
4387, pp. 59–75). Berlin: Springer.
Fitting, S., Wedell, D. H., & Allen, G. L. (2005). Memory for
spatial location: Influences of environmental cues and task
field rotation. In A. G. Cohn & D. M. Mark (Eds.), COSIT
2005 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp, Vol. 3693, pp.
459–474). Berlin: Springer.
Fitting, S., Wedell, D. H., & Allen, G. L. (2007). Memory for spatial
location: Cue effects as a function of field rotation. Memory &
Cognition, 35, 1641–1658.
Franklin, N., Henkel, L. A., & Zangas, T. (1995). Parsing surrounding
space into regions. Memory & Cognition, 23, 397–407.
doi:10.3758/BF03197242
Gallistel, C. R. (1990). The organization of learning. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Haun, D. B. M., Allen, G. L., & Wedell, D. H. (2005). Bias in spatial
memory: A categorical endorsement. Acta Psychologica, 118,
149–170.
Henke, K. (2010). A model for memory systems based on processing
modes rather than consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience,
11, 523–532.
Hutcheson, A. T., & Wedell, D. H. (2012). From maps to navigation: The
role of cues in finding locations in a virtual environment. Memory &
Cognition, 40, 946–957. doi:10.3758/s13421-012-0192-6

1143
Huttenlocher, J., Hedges, L. V., & Duncan, S. (1991). Categories and
particulars: Prototype effects in estimating spatial location. Psychological Review, 98, 352–376. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.98.3.352
Lew, A. R. (2011). Looking beyond the boundaries: Time to put
landmarks back on the cognitive map. Psychological Bulletin,
137, 484–507.
May, M. (2004). Imaginal perspective switches in remembered environments: Transformation versus interference accounts. Cognitive
Psychology, 48, 163–206.
McDonald, R. J., & White, N. M. (1994). Parallel information processing in the water maze: Evidence for independent memory
systems involving dorsal striatum and hippocampus. Behavioral
and Neural Biology, 61, 260–270.
O’Keefe, J., & Burgess, N. (1996). Geometric determinants of the
place fields of hippocampal neurons. Nature, 381, 425–428.
Philbeck, J., Sargent, J., Arthur, J., & Dopkins, S. (2008). Large
manual pointing errors, but accurate verbal reports, for indications
of target azimuth. Perception, 37, 511–534.
Sargent, J., Dopkins, S., & Philbeck, J. (2011). Dynamic category
structure in spatial memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
18, 1105–1112. doi:10.3758/s13423-011-0139-0
Sargent, J., Dopkins, S., Philbeck, J., & Chichka, D. (2010).
Chunking in spatial memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 576–589.
doi:10.1037/a0017528
Tommasi, L., Chiandetti, C., Pecchia, T., Sovrano, V., & Vallortigara,
G. (2012). From natural geometry to spatial cognition. Neuroscience
and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36, 799–824.
Waller, D., Montello, D. R., Richardson, A. E., & Hegarty, M. (2002).
Orientation specificity and spatial updating of memories for layouts.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 28, 1051–1063.
Wang, R. F., Crowell, J. A., Simons, D. J., Irwin, D. E., Kramer, A. F.,
Ambinder, M. S., & Hsieh, B. B. (2006). Spatial updating
relies on an egocentric representation of space: Effects of the
number of objects. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 281–286.
doi:10.3758/BF03193844
Wang, R. F., & Spelke, E. S. (2000). Updating egocentric representations
in human navigation. Cognition, 77, 215–250.
Wang, R. F., & Spelke, E. S. (2002). Human spatial representation: Insights from animals. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6,
376–382.

